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Legal scholarship highlight: Confronting Supreme Court fact finding
Supreme Court Justices routinely  answer factual questions about the world – such as whether v iolent v ideo games have a harmful effect on child
brain development or whether a partial birth abortion is ever medically  necessary .  The traditional v iew is that these findings – often called
“legislative facts” – are informed through the adversary  sy stem: by  rev iewing ev idence on the record and briefs on appeal.  Routinely , however,
the Justices also engage in what I call “in house” fact finding.  They  independently  look bey ond the briefs and record to answer general questions
of fact, and they  rely  on their discoveries as authorities.  To be sure, judges have alway s done this.  We have all heard the stories of Justice
Blackmun holed up in the medical library  at the May o Clinic during the summer of 197 2 study ing abortion procedures.  And the Federal Rules of
Evidence contain no rule restricting it; the rule about judicial notice specifically  exempts legislative facts from its scope.
But times have changed.  The world has recently  undergone a massive revolution in the way  it receives and evaluates information.  No longer do
Justices need to trek to the library  to look up factual questions. Instead they  can access v irtually  infinite amounts of factual information at the
click of a mouse.   If the Justices want more empirical support for a factual dimension of their argument, they  can find it easily  and without the
help of any one outside of the Supreme Court building.
My  article, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, (available here) discusses how that change in technology  has and will affect the Court’s fact-
finding practice. It collects over one hundred examples of factual authorities on which recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court relied that
were found “in house” – i.e., that cannot be found in any  of the party  briefs, amici  briefs, or the joint record.  These are not insignificant rarities:
almost sixty  percent of the most important Court opinions in the last ten y ears (as identified by  political scientists) rely  on in-house research at
least once.   Virtually  all of the Justices do this, and they  do it on a variety  of topics using a variety  of different sources – from newspapers to law
rev iew articles to statistics culled from an advocacy  group’s website.   As I describe in my  article, sometimes these authorities are used
rhetorically  – to show practical consequences of a different outcome, for example, or to emphasize the emerging significance of an issue.  But
other times these authorities are marshaled to support dispositive factual assertions – for example, that African-American children in integrated
schools are more successful, or that walking the course is an essential component of the game of golf.
So what do we make of the observation that Justices need not rely  on the adversary  method to answer factual questions or mount factual
dimensions of their arguments any more? Assuming – as I think it is safe to do – that the digital revolution and dramatic change in the way  we all
access information means in-house fact finding will only  increase over time, should it make any  difference to our normative reactions about the
process for this brand of judicial decision-making?
My  answer – not surprisingly  – is y es.  The world looks very  different from the way  it looked when legislative facts were exempted from the scope
of judicial notice rules in 197 5. Of course there are benefits to letting judges research freely  in a new digital age.  Judges presumably  make better
decisions when they  know more.  But there are also troubling effects that accompany  a robust practice of in-house judicial fact finding today . 
This article addresses three of them: (1) the sy stematic introduction of bias; (2) the possibility  of mistake; and (3) concerns about notice and
legitimacy . Certainly  these risks have alway s existed when judges look outside the record on questions of fact, but the dangers are more potent in
a world where information is easily  accessed and freely  traded.
First, in terms of bias, to “google” something is now common parlance and common practice for looking up an unknown fact.  But internet
searches like these may  not present results in a neutral fashion.  Since web companies – like Google – can gather vast amounts of information
about their users and because they  try  to tailor serv ices to our personal tastes, some claim the search engines filter the results depending on the
searcher.  A search for statistics on fatalities in police chases, or a search for the phy siological effect of the chemicals used in lethal injection
could produce different results for different chambers depending on, for example, the internet history  (or Facebook profile!) of the users. The end
result is worse than a Justice purposely  finding something to cite that supports what she wants to argue; it is that she will only  find factual
authorities to support what it is she wants to argue.  This opens a real possibility  for the sy stemic introduction of bias – unrealized bias – into
assertions of fact in judicial opinions.
As is true with the risk of incorporating bias into judicial opinions, the risk of factual mistakes is also one that is exacerbated by  new modes of
digital research.  Not only  is data easier to find thanks to the internet, but – importantly  – it is also easier to post.  Some factual information on
the internet is trust-worthy , but some of it is not; and discerning the difference is not alway s easy .  Moreover, Justices – like all of us – have a
tendency  to engage in “motivated reasoning” and to look for facts that support the argument they  are building, wherever those facts may  come
from, and despite what other opposing authority  is out there.   This tendency  may  encourage the ad hoc and potentially  mistaken evaluation of
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scientific findings – looking for what one wants to see – particularly  if the studies to be used as authorities were never tested by  the adversarial
method or addressed by  experts below.  Couple this reality  with the new instant ability  to find facts to support almost any thing, and confidence
in judicial fact finding outside their areas of expertise diminishes significantly .
Finally , even if Justices are good at independent research in the digital age and even if worries about mistakes and bias are overblown, there
remains a basic question of fairness.  This concern has two components: (1) the short-term fairness question with respect to the parties; and (2)
the long-term fairness question about the legitimacy  of Supreme Court decisions generally .  With respect to the parties, in-house fact finding
threatens democratic values that accompany  participation in the adversary  sy stem: the parties are denied the chance to weigh in and address
potentially  biased or mistaken factual authorities.  In addition, as others have argued, there are good institutional reasons why  legislatures and
agencies – not courts – are ty pically  given the responsibility  of investigating facts on their own.   Putting aside the practical reasons for this
div ision of labor, there remains a question of whether judicially  found factual authorities are legitimate in the ey es of the public.
My  article concludes by  offering preliminary  thoughts on what should be done to fix  this problem.  It offers two independent and contrasting
solutions: new procedural rules that restrict reliance on factual authorities found in house, or alterations to the adversary  method to allow for
more public participation.   The first brand of solution could take many  forms short of a remand.  Possibilities include: additional briefing if a
factual question remains hazy  on the record, or a canon of avoidance that would mean that the Court should not decide a case in a way  that
would require extra-record fact finding.  An entirely  different solution is to make judges better at evaluating legislative facts without the parties’
help.  Reform possibilities here include: additional training for judges on empirics, the creation of a research serv ice, or even opening up the
process completely , so that the Court would solicit opinions and ev idence from all interested parties and encourage public participation in the
amicus  process – much like the notice-and-comment process in administrative agencies.
Regardless of which course is more persuasive, both are superior to the outdated procedural void that currently  exists. As the pace of accessing
information accelerates exponentially  – and judges are understandably  tempted to take advantage of it – we need to seriously  contemplate the
implications of in-house judicial fact finding and to update our approach to accommodate them.
Allison Orr Larsen is an Assistant Professor of Law at William & Mary Law School.  Her research interests include administrative law,
constitutional law, and the institutional and informational dynamics of legal decision making.
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